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A GROWING PLATFORM FOR HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE

Dear Readers,

With this third edition of the Human Rights Chronicle, we are pleased to see the publication continue to grow as a platform connecting research, practice and contemporary human rights debates. We are grateful to the researchers and practitioners who contribute their ideas and perspectives, and to our readers for their continued engagement. Across very different contexts, our contributors engage with some of the defining questions of our time: how artificial intelligence is reshaping the labour landscape and access to opportunity; the vulnerability of migrants vis-à-vis legal regimes; the use of climate rights to seek remedies; and other pressing issues. These contributions highlight some of the tensions that exist between those in positions of power and the most vulnerable populations, and how human rights can remain meaningful in a world that is undergoing some profound geopolitical, social and technological transformations. They also illustrate how the most important human rights questions emerge precisely at the intersection of research, lived experiences and diverse perspectives. And this is the kind of conversation that the Human Rights Chronicle intends to foster. We hope this edition will not only inform, but also provoke reflection, disagreement and new questions, because human rights advance mostly through our willingness to keep asking better questions.

Dr Fabrice Crégut - Executive Director

OPINION PIECE

AI, LIVELIHOODS AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Human Rights Conventions do not mention the word "livelihoods." However, it implies it through the Right to Work (ICESCR, 1966, Art. 6; UDHR, 1948, Art. 23(3)) and the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living (ICESCR, 1966, Art. 11; UDHR, 1948, Art. 23(3)).Other instruments extend the livelihood challenge to Indigenous Peoples, rural persons and displaced people. The problem of interpreting the conventions lies in defining what constitutes an opportunity to gain work with freedom of choice, who decides an adequate standard of living, and what "worthy of human dignity" means. The promise of AI has been disillusioning because it requires huge costs, can be easily weaponized, and may shift society and culture at a speed that is difficult to reverse. At the 81st UNGA session, UN Secretary-General António Guterres cautioned about the transfer of power from humans to machines such as AI. AI changes work from jobs, which lead to livelihoods, to smaller tasks, and from meaningful work to processes and profits, making it harder to ensure livelihoods. AI's rapid adoption post-COVID has created uncertainty in job markets and the "future of work". A livelihood is a ***sustained capacity*** to generate value, dignity, and security over time, encompassing income, purpose, identity, and belonging, and is more resilient to disruption than a job description because it is organised around the person rather than the task (Esposito & Stephens, 2026).

The importance of livelihoods: We spend much of our adult lives working to support ourselves and our families – that is 13% of an 80-year life! But is there still Freedom of Choice? Finding a new job or having a second job when there is no choice is less enjoyable than leisure activities (Time 2024). Studies on psychological distress from job loss during COVID suggest long-term effects (Ringlein et al., 2024). The World Economic Forum's *Future of Jobs Report 2025* estimates that 59% of the world's employees will need to find new jobs due to structural changes from AI and geopolitics, while 39% of their skills will become outdated. Companies surveyed said they planned to redeploy most of those displaced workers within the organization, but mass automated layoffs suggest otherwise. A Goldman Sachs study (Fortune 2026) found that 192,000 net positions were eliminated per month. No government has a strong enough evidence-based policy on how long it will take to reskill for a new job, who bears the costs, or how to mitigate the psychological distress during this process. Policies for countries with aging workers will need to differ from those with younger job seekers. Women are more affected by AI job loss than men, highlighting another human rights issue contravening the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. The Guardian (2026) highlights the risks of automated AI recruitment services, including discrimination, reinforced bias, and privacy infringements.

Human Dignity and Social Fabric: Human dignity recognises human beings as a distinct social species, with a moral responsibility to respect and protect the value of others (Regilme Jr. & Feijoo, 2021). Hence, it is choice we humans make: humans versus machines like AI. How does the adoption of AI affect human dignity? Workplaces provide some form of social interaction - this is not the same as meeting up using AI technologies. The US Surgeon General's report, "Our Epidemic of Loneliness and Isolation" (2023), highlighted the impact of loneliness on premature deaths, increased health care costs, academic and work performance, and the fraying of the social fabric and trust. A recent survey found that 76% of workers want more human connection as AI usage grows (Workday, 2026). We are now seeing a growing number of single households among younger and older people (Snell, 2017; World Population Clock, 2026), with some devastating effects. AI is bringing jobs at the lower end of the value chain to countries – some of these are traumatic, like content moderation – while earnings have gone up, but human dignity may not. Add to this the issue of human copyright, which AI excels at "stealing" from, resulting in associated job loss. AI can build social cohesion and celebrate human dignity or it can mock human dignity and weaken the social fabric.

Healthspan and Lifespan: AI is working behind the scenes for longevity. A livelihood supports you and your elderly dependents in old age. Thanks to miracles in science, we now live approximately 9.6 years with chronic disease before death across all 183 World Health Organization member states, which means when you work, those earnings need to support the additional costs of healthspan. This impact of AI on livelihood insecurity contravenes the Right to Health (ICESCR Article 12; UDHR Article 25).

Right to Knowledge: To get a good job, you need education. UNESCO (2025) highlights that education leads to jobs, higher earnings, and lifelong learning, boosting a person's earnings by 10% for each additional year of learning. While the Right to Education is enshrined in several conventions, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Article 24), its promise is dwindling. AI is disproportionately affecting entry-level jobs, with a 19% impact, according to a Stanford study (Brynjolfsson et al., 2026), creating a knowledge gap for new workers who cannot develop skills for higher-end jobs. AI can also create confidence without competence, as access to information may give the impression of expertise (Eleftheriou et al., 2026). Cognitive offloading may reduce critical thinking and contribute to skills atrophy (Chirayath et al., 2025; Ganuthula & Singh, 2026). The future of livelihoods requires the right to knowledge, not just the abundant information provided by AI, with consequences for employment and society. The World Economic Forum's Global Risks Report 2026, finds that AI-powered narrative attacks are destabilizing societies and eroding trust.

AI is a dual-purpose technology. It offers great transformational benefits, but as Kristalina Georgieva, IMF Managing Director (2026), cautioned, "AI could hit the labor market like a tsunami, affecting up to 60 percent of jobs in advanced economies," with global repercussions. Human rights are based on valuing human beings; this is therefore not a choice, but a promise we must keep for the benefit of humanity.

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WHAT'S NEWS?

UN AND ICRC CALL FOR NEW RULES ON AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS

On 25 August 2026, UN Secretary-General António Guterres and ICRC President Mirjana Spoljaric renewed their call for States to urgently adopt new international rules on autonomous weapon systems. The joint appeal highlighted growing concerns over the rapid development and use of autonomous weapons, particularly the potential reduction of human control over decisions to use force and the resulting risks to civilians and civilian infrastructure. Building on more than a decade of discussions under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the UN and ICRC called for negotiations on a legally binding instrument establishing clear prohibitions and restrictions, with the upcoming CCW Review Conference in November identified as a key opportunity for States to advance this process.

OHCHR RAISES NEW CONCERNS OVER POSSIBLE WAR CRIMES IN GAZA

In September 2026, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights raised concerns over possible violations of international humanitarian law following the recovery of hundreds of bodies and human remains from destroyed buildings across Gaza. OHCHR stressed the need for investigations and preservation of evidence, particularly in relation to the conduct of hostilities in densely populated areas. The Office called for greater access for independent investigators and emphasised that any violations of international humanitarian and human rights law must be properly investigated.

UN WORKING GROUP ADVANCES DISCUSSIONS ON CHILDREN'S RIGHT TO EDUCATION

From 31 August to 2 September 2026, an open-ended intergovernmental working group met in Geneva to explore a possible Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the rights to early childhood education, free pre-primary education and free secondary education. The discussions focused on how the international legal framework could further strengthen children's right to education, including through clearer standards on equality, access and participation. The working group also considered the views of children and the challenges posed by conflict, crises and digital technologies. Its conclusions and recommendations will inform the possible preparation of a draft Optional Protocol.

CERD ADOPTS NEW GUIDANCE ON REPARATORY JUSTICE

In August 2026, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) adopted General Recommendation No. 40 on reparatory justice for the consequences of colonialism, the trafficking and enslavement of Africans, and racialized chattel slavery. The recommendation sets out measures aimed at addressing both historical harms and their continuing effects, including through truth-telling, historical memory, education, structural equality and reparatory measures. It places reparatory justice within States' existing obligations to combat racial discrimination and promote substantive equality, providing new guidance for national and international efforts to address these legacies.

YEMEN: ESCALATING FIGHTING TRIGGERS NEW WAVE OF DISPLACEMENT

On 22 September, UNHCR reported that escalating fighting in Yemen had displaced more than 130,000 people since the beginning of September, with at least 110 casualties reported. The renewed displacement is spreading across several governorates, while people are also crossing into Djibouti, Somalia and elsewhere. UNHCR warned that the crisis is unfolding against an already severe humanitarian situation, with more than 5.2 million internally displaced people in Yemen and more than 22 million people requiring humanitarian assistance.

UN WARNS OF GROWING TRANSNATIONAL REPRESSION AGAINST THOSE ENGAGING WITH HUMAN RIGHTS MECHANISMS

In a joint statement, United Nations human rights experts raised concerns over transnational repression, referring to measures used by States to silence, deter, punish or otherwise harm individuals and communities abroad because of their views, identity or human rights activities. The experts highlighted practices including harassment, arbitrary detention, restrictions on movement, surveillance and misuse of legal and law-enforcement mechanisms, as well as growing use of digital tools such as online harassment, disinformation and AI-generated content. They also stressed that reprisals against people cooperating with the UN constitute intimidation and can have a wider chilling effect on civic space and international human rights engagement.

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE & INCLUSIVE SOCIETIES

CRIMINAL BY DEFAULT: HOW LEBANON'S KAFALA SYSTEM MANUFACTURES MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS' CRIMINALITY

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"I last saw my passport at the airport, where the General Security took it and gave it to my employer…. I am her property, and so are my papers, she thinks… It will follow me to my death" (Pande, 2013, p. 422). Dalila's testimony reflects the everyday legal reality of migrant domestic workers (MDWs) in Lebanon, where an estimated 250,000 women from Ethiopia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh live and work inside private households under the kafala system. While this system ties a worker's legal residency to a single employer, Lebanon's Labour Law further marginalizes them by excluding them from its protections under Article 7 (Saghieh, 2015) and stripping them of minimum wage and maximum working hours. Additionally, the Foreigners Law makes leaving a sponsor an act that revokes legal status, exposing a worker to detention and deportation. Often described as a modern form of slavery, the kafala system pushes some MDWs to flee their employers as a last resort for survival. Therefore, what appears as individual cases of escape becomes a structural condition of vulnerability under this legal architecture rather than a personal criminal choice, inviting a closer examination of how this criminalization is produced.

This essay argues that the criminalization of migrant domestic workers in Lebanon is structural rather than incidental, especially as class and gender operate as deliberate mechanisms that are rooted in a colonial legal genealogy and turn escape from exploitation into an outlawed offence. Throughout the analysis, race operates as the historical condition that shapes who the law targets, yet the argument remains focused on the intersection of the legal mechanisms of both class and gender in which this criminalization is produced.

The Kafala System: A Colonial Legal Inheritance

Before examining class and gender's mechanisms within the kafala system, understanding the criminalization cycle of MDWs begins by tracing the structural colonial roots of the kafala system itself. Kafala was first adopted by the Arab region as a result of the colonization practices in the Gulf in general, where British officials introduced sponsorship requirements in the Gulf pearl industry in the 1920s to police empire cheaply and efficiently (AlShehabi, 2019). In Lebanon, the system took root as a legacy of French colonialism, as the new state's elites mimicked the colonial social order to preserve gendered hierarchies (Gonzalez Noveiri, 2021). After the Civil War (1975–1990), employers shifted from local to non-Arab labour (Jureidini, 2009; Kassamali, 2021), and a Christian Maronite elite that identified as a "Westernized" bourgeoisie used imported European racial theories to distance itself from "Blackness" and entrench a hierarchy over domestic workers (Gonzalez Noveiri, 2021). This hierarchy was legalized on several fronts: the 1946 Labour Law's Article 7 excluded domestic workers from labour protections (Human Rights Watch, 2010; Saghieh, 2015), and the 1962 Foreigners Law made leaving a sponsor grounds for arrest (Gonzalez Noveiri, 2021; Pande, 2013). Together, these laws deny MDWs legal personhood before they even enter the country, making class and gender effective tools through which the law deepens a pre-existing culture of dehumanization. This genealogy awakens us to the fact that we cannot merely offer singular legal solutions to this marginalization without challenging its structural origins or the intersecting mechanisms that feed into it, such as class and gender.

Class as a Mechanism Towards Migrant Domestic Workers' Criminalization

Stuart Hall's theorization of criminalization is a useful lens to understand class's relationship with the criminalization of MDWs. Crime is not a neutral response to harm but a category defined by the governing class to manage populations it depends on but does not want to protect. Migrant workers, denied rights through Article 7 (Saghieh, 2015), are placed permanently on the "wrong side of the law." Their loss of legal status extends to simply residing outside their sponsor's house. This legal architecture punishes the victim rather than the perpetrator, allowing sponsors to routinely confiscate passports, lock workers inside homes ("When Madame would leave, she would lock me in the house," Human Rights Watch, 2010, p. 22), and withhold wages for months. When a worker finally escapes unpaid labour, her flight is reclassified as

"absconding", and General Security detains her for months. Employers reinforce this by filing retaliatory theft charges against workers who threaten to report abuse. The fact that 73% of criminal cases against MDWs specifically accused of a crime are for theft (Human Rights Watch, 2010) demonstrates the type of criminality that the government generally leverages. Article 7 further bans unionization, stripping workers of any collective route to dignity. This is what Rob Nixon defines as slow violence: a harm that "occurs gradually and out of sight," accumulating through years of unpaid wages, confinement, and legal uncertainty until criminalization looks like an individual failing rather than a designed outcome. Gender operates as a separate mechanism that contributes to the continuity of class segregation.

Gender as a Mechanism Towards Migrant Domestic Workers' Criminalization

Gender's role in criminalization might be less visible than class, as it operates under the language of protection. Elizabeth Bernstein's concept of carceral feminism describes how struggles for gender justice are recast in the language of prisons and policing. In Lebanon, a MDWs can only break her contract without penalty by proving, through forensic medical and police reports, that she suffered extreme physical or sexual violence. Such evidence is nearly impossible to gather when a worker is confined to her employer's home, denied phones, and cut off from independent medical care. This traps MDWs, who are mostly women, in a victim-or-criminal binary: roughly 68% of MDWs in Lebanon report experiencing sexual harassment or assault (Diab et al., 2023), yet these cases are treated as private disputes between individuals rather than as a structural problem the state itself sustains. When a worker instead flees violence without forensic proof, the judiciary treats her escape as evidence of criminality, even when she cites being locked inside, denied food, or burned with irons. The same logic that confines women in the employer's home is repeated in detention, where Ethiopian women held in Beirut prisons describe guards who "act like we are not humans," denying them translators and basic dignity (Yimer et al., 2025).

Class and Gender: Operating Within One Complementary Framework

While class produces the physical and economic conditions by which MDWs are made vulnerable through instruments like Article 7 of the labor law, stripping workers of standard labor protection and the right to collective organization, gender ensures that justice can only be provided through selective circumstances through the logic of carceral feminism. In practice, access to protection often depends on meeting demanding evidentiary requirements, as workers may be required to provide medical or police reports to substantiate claims of abuse. For many MDWs, restrictions on movement, privacy, and access to independent support services can make gathering such evidence particularly difficult.

Race, however, is the condition that lies underneath both: Lebanese citizens of equivalent economic status are not excluded from labour protections, whereas workers from Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Ethiopia, and Bangladesh are. The kafala system therefore persists because it serves the state on multiple fronts: economically, by extracting labour at wages citizens would not accept; politically, by reinforcing a postcolonial racial hierarchy; and legally, by providing a mechanism to regulate a population that is structurally excluded from protection. These layers place MDWs in a legal trap in which attempts to escape abusive conditions may themselves result in violations of the law.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

The criminalization of migrant domestic workers in Lebanon is rooted in a legal architecture that extends beyond individual abuses. Meaningful reform would therefore require:

Abolishing the kafala system and delinking residency status from a single employer, so that leaving a sponsor no longer automatically renders a worker "illegal."

Repealing Article 7's exclusion of domestic workers from Lebanon's Labour Law, extending minimum wage, working-hour limits, and the right to unionize.

Removing the forensic-evidence requirement as the sole route to a penalty-free contract exit, and creating independent, confidential reporting channels outside the employer-controlled household.

Reviewing "absconding" and theft complaints filed by sponsors against workers who have raised abuse or wage claims, to screen out retaliatory charges before detention follows.

Engaging recruitment agencies and sponsors directly in any reform process, since the law's design currently insulates both from accountability.

Reforming the kafala system also requires looking beyond individual laws and abuses to the deeper structures that have shaped labour, mobility, and access to protection. Meaningful abolition therefore requires confronting the assumptions about whose rights and protection are recognised within this system.

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE & INCLUSIVE SOCIETIES

FOREIGNERS IN THE MOTHERLAND: GENDER-DISCRIMINATORY NATIONALITY LAWS AND THE RISK OF STATELESSNESS AMONG CHILDREN OF MIGRANT FATHERS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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Imagine being treated as a foreigner, stateless, or non-national in the very country where you were born and have lived your entire life. This can be the experience of some children born in mixed-nationality families who are unable to acquire nationality from their parents owing to the paternal *jus sanguinis* nationality regimes of certain Middle Eastern countries. In majority of the MENA states, nationality is primarily acquired at birth through paternal descent, while maternal descent is followed under exceptional circumstances, such as if the father is unknown or stateless[1]. The legal inability of mothers to confer nationality may produce the risk of childhood statelessness in situations when they are married to non-national migrants.

How Does Nationality Get Gendered?

Nationality is a legal bond between a person and a state. Modern states have established the following two primary modes of nationality acquisition: *jus soli* (nationality by birth) and *jus sanguinis (*nationality by descent).

Jus soli is a more gender-neutral principle, as it makes birth within a country the principal criterion to obtain nationality. However, *jus sanguinis* could inadvertently introduce gender discrimination by fixing nationality conferral to a particular parent – mother or father. Historically, modern states' nationality laws have predominantly favoured paternal over maternal descent as a means of nationality transmission. Paternal *jus sanguinis* became the principal determinant of nationality in 18th-19th century European states, which followed agnatic descent in granting nationality to children. Through British and French colonial, mandate, and protectorate rule, such European legal provisions influenced the nationality frameworks of many MENA countries, including their preference for *jus sanguinis* over *jus soli* for determining nationality in postcolonial regimes [2].

Can Paternal *Jus Sanguinis* Cause Statelessness?

When nationality is acquired exclusively through the father, it potentially creates a risk of childhood statelessness, particularly among children born in mixed-nationality families. For instance, children born in their mother's country, where paternal *jus sanguinis* is the only criterion for nationality acquisition, may not be able to acquire nationality if their father is a non-national (foreigner) and his country recognises *jus soli*. Given that paternal *jus sanguinis* also prevents mothers from passing nationality, the risk of their child's statelessness emerges from the fact that the father's nationality cannot be transmitted through descent, while the mother is already legally barred from conferring nationality.

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has the largest number of states that follow paternal descent in conferring nationality to children. There are at least twelve countries across the region where mothers cannot confer nationality on an equal basis with men, including the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states - Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) along with Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Sudan, and Syria.[3]

Migration Dynamics in the Middle East

Historically, the Arabian Peninsula has been a migratory region, hosting populations from different parts of the world since ancient times. Contemporary migration in the region is predominantly employment-based, with low-skilled/blue collar labourers comprising the majority of the migrant population. The six GCC countries alone have the largest migrant workforce in the entire region, with India leading the group with 9.1 million expatriates, followed by Bangladesh (5M), Pakistan (4.9M), Egypt (3.3M), and the Philippines (2.2M). [4] The existing data also suggest that non-nationals have outnumbered the citizens in Bahrain (53.2%), Kuwait (67.3%), the UAE (87.1%), and Qatar (87.9%).[5] Despite the temporary nature of employment, many migrants are forced to spend their entire lives in these countries. The UAE demographic data in 2024 reported 1,550 child births to Emirati mothers married to non-national fathers.[6] These figures indicate the number of children born in mixed-nationality families, but do not in themselves indicate statelessness or risk thereof, which depends on each child's nationality rights and legal pathways.

Risk of Statelessness Among Children of Migrants and its Implications

A stateless person is someone who is not considered a national by any State under the operation of its law.[7] Children of non-national fathers who are unable to acquire their father's nationality are potentially exposed to such risks of statelessness. For instance, Qatar's nationality law [8] grants nationality to every child born to a Qatari father, but children born to a Qatari mother and non-Qatari fathers cannot inherit Qatar's nationality through maternal descent. Their other pathway to nationality is naturalisation. However, naturalisation is subject to the state's discretion. Without a guaranteed pathway to nationality, the risk of statelessness increases for the children of migrant fathers when they cannot acquire their father's nationality, in cases when:

1. the father's country recognises *jus soli* and prevents nationality transmission through descent

2. the father lacks identity documentation (national ID, marriage certificate)

3. the father denies paternity, or leaves the mother before the child is born

As stateless individuals, these children are likely to face significant hardships in accessing some of the fundamental human rights:

Education: Some public schools do not admit stateless children until citizens have been registered. At university level, they may be treated as foreign students and face limited access to reserved places.

Employment: Limited educational opportunities can affect future employment prospects. In some Gulf states, public-sector positions are reserved for nationals; Saudi Arabia, for example, restricts certain occupations to Saudi citizens.[9]

Health Care: Stateless children may face difficulties accessing state-sponsored healthcare where identity documents are required to obtain services.

Residency: In some Gulf states, children of non-national fathers must obtain residency permits. In Kuwait, for example, mothers can sponsor their sons only until the age of 21, potentially leaving them without secure residency thereafter.

The Status of Nationality Reforms

Gender discrimination in nationality laws is an issue of human rights as much as it is of gender inequality. Although the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (1954) and the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961) are the two primary statelessness conventions, they do not address statelessness caused by gender-discriminatory nationality provisions. In this context, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 1979 is a landmark treaty, as Article 9(2) calls on States Parties to grant women equal rights with men with respect to the nationality of their children. Some MENA countries, such as Egypt (2004), Algeria (2005), Morocco (2007), Tunisia (2010), and Yemen (2010), have reformed their nationality laws, allowing mothers to confer nationality. Other countries, including the six GCC nations, continue to maintain varying degrees of gender inequality in nationality transmission and different legal safeguards for children of national mothers and foreign fathers. [10] In the UAE, a 2017 measure allowed eligible children of Emirati mothers married to foreigners to apply for nationality upon attaining the age of six. This provides a specific pathway to nationality for a category of children who may otherwise face limitations in acquiring nationality through maternal descent.

In Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, children can acquire nationality through maternal descent only in exceptional cases, while the children of foreign fathers remain excluded from these exceptions.

Recommendations

States parties should withdraw reservations to Article 9(2) of CEDAW and grant women and men equal rights to confer nationality.

States should adopt preventive measures to reduce instances of childhood statelessness, including birth registration of every child regardless of their parent's status.

All states should ensure children's guaranteed access to essential rights such as education, healthcare, and residency regardless of their nationality status.

Apart from the international human rights frameworks and treaties, regional advocacy efforts by civil society organisations should be strengthened.

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CLIMATE CHANGE
& HUMAN RIGHTS

FROM RECOGNITION TO REMEDY: ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL MECHANISMS FOR CLIMATE-RELATED HUMAN RIGHTS

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When a family loses its home to a flood, a farmer can no longer depend on the water that sustained a livelihood, or a child's health suffers during extreme heat, climate change is experienced as a question of rights long before it reaches a courtroom. The rights at stake include life, health, water, food, housing, work, culture and development. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change confirms that climate change is already causing widespread harm to people and ecosystems, with communities that have contributed least to the crisis often facing the greatest risks. International law has begun to catch up. In 2022, the United Nations General Assembly recognised the human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment. For a person already living with climate harm, however, recognition matters only if it changes a decision, prevents further loss or opens a route to remedy. My research, informed by work with human-rights institutions and civil-society organisations in Egypt and the wider MENA region, examines where that route now exists and why it so often ends before a remedy is delivered.

How effectiveness should be judged

The number of resolutions, reports and cases tells us little on its own. An effective mechanism must be reachable by affected people, clarify who is responsible and give communities access to information and a meaningful voice. Its findings should also lead to prevention, policy change or reparation. Measured in this way, the current system is uneven. International bodies are much better at identifying climate harm as a human-rights issue than they are at ensuring that governments act on their findings.

What the Geneva system can deliver

The Paris Agreement refers to human rights in its preamble, but the climate regime does not give individuals a complaints procedure or a direct route to reparation. Geneva-based human-rights mechanisms partly fill this gap. The Universal Periodic Review can place climate risks within recommendations addressed to a particular state. Special Procedures can send communications, visit countries and clarify standards on climate change, water, housing, health and environmental defenders. Treaty bodies interpret existing conventions in the light of environmental harm. The Committee on the Rights of the Child's General Comment No. 26, for example, explains how environmental degradation and climate change affect states' obligations to children. Where a state has accepted the relevant procedure, a treaty body may also consider an individual complaint.

Geneva's strength lies in keeping a problem on the public record and connecting climate decisions to legal duties that states already owe to people. In practice, a UPR recommendation or a Special Rapporteur's communication can give national human-rights institutions and civil-society groups useful leverage in domestic debate. But leverage is not enforcement.

Many recommendations have no deadline, named implementing authority or regular follow-up. Climate data also sits in reporting systems that rarely speak to one another. Communities may therefore present the same evidence to climate authorities, treaty bodies, Special Rapporteurs and the UPR without receiving a coordinated response.

Regional progress and continuing barriers

Recent decisions show how far climate accountability has travelled, as well as how much remains unresolved. In its advisory opinion of 23 July 2025, the International Court of Justice clarified states' obligations in relation to climate change and the legal consequences that may follow from a breach. The opinion does not compensate particular victims. It does, however, give governments, courts and human-rights bodies an authoritative basis for assessing state conduct.

In 2024, the European Court of Human Rights found that Switzerland had failed to provide effective protection against serious climate impacts in KlimaSeniorinnen v Switzerland. The judgment was a significant advance, but applications decided alongside it failed on jurisdiction, victim-status or exhaustion grounds. Stronger legal principles do not remove the practical barriers to bringing a case. The Inter-American Court's 2025 advisory opinion on the climate emergency also gives detailed guidance on state duties, although its effect will depend on how public authorities and domestic courts use it.

The Aarhus and Escazú agreements approach accountability from another direction. Both give practical meaning to access to information, public participation and access to justice. Aarhus allows members of the public to raise compliance concerns before independent experts and includes a rapid-response mechanism for environmental defenders. Escazú expressly protects defenders, although its compliance process is consultative and non-punitive. These agreements make institutions more accessible, but they still rely on national authorities to turn regional standards into protection and remedy.

Why the MENA region matters

The implementation gap is especially clear in the Middle East and North Africa. It is misleading to treat the region as a single climate profile: oil-exporting states, lower-income countries and states affected by conflict have very different capacities and responsibilities. Yet serious exposure to extreme heat, water scarcity, coastal risk, food insecurity and displacement cuts across the region. There is also no single MENA-wide court or petition system comparable to the European and Inter-American arrangements. Geneva mechanisms therefore carry particular weight. At present, state reports, UPR recommendations and national follow-up plans address climate harm unevenly, while people already facing discrimination often encounter the greatest barriers to participation and remedy.

Four priorities for stronger protection

Use a small set of measurable benchmarks. UPR and treaty-body reviews should assess mitigation, adaptation and responses to loss and damage against consistent human-rights indicators. Each recommendation should name the responsible institution, set a realistic deadline and state the result expected for affected people.

Give one national institution responsibility for follow-up. Each government should maintain a public plan linking relevant UPR, treaty-body and Special Procedure recommendations to its nationally determined contribution and adaptation plan. Parliaments, national human-rights institutions and civil society could then see which commitments have been acted upon and which remain unfulfilled.

Treat information and participation as safeguards. Drawing on Aarhus and Escazú, states should disclose climate risks early, consult communities before approving policies or projects, provide affordable review procedures and protect defenders from threats or reprisals. Participation should be capable of changing a decision, rather than serving as a record that a meeting took place.

Build workable remedies at home. National human-rights institutions should monitor climate plans, investigate recurring patterns of harm, receive complaints where their mandates permit and report directly to Geneva mechanisms. Courts, legal-aid providers and civil-society organisations need reliable climate data and technical expertise. Climate finance and major transition projects should include human-rights impact assessments and independent grievance procedures.

The measure of success

Regional and international mechanisms have changed the legal conversation. Communities can frame climate harm as a rights claim, states must explain their choices and courts have a stronger basis for review. What is still missing is a reliable route from evidence to decision, and from decision to implementation. Success should be visible in ordinary terms: a community receives the information it requested, a risky project changes after genuine consultation, a defender can work safely, or a person harmed by an avoidable failure obtains a remedy. Geneva's contribution will be judged by whether it helps make such outcomes routine rather than exceptional.

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CLIMATE CHANGE
& HUMAN RIGHTS

RURAL COMMUNITIES' PARTICIPATION IN AGROECOLOGICAL INNOVATION: THE FO-RI PROJECT IN BURKINA FASO

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Rural Participation, Endogenous Knowledge and the FO-RI Project

In Burkina Faso, rural communities face several challenges affecting their production systems, including soil degradation, climate variability, and difficulties related to agricultural production and post-harvest conservation. In this context, the participation of rural actors in development initiatives is important for better considering local realities and knowledge developed within communities. This article analyses rural communities' participation in the FO-RI (Farmers' Organizations Leading Research and Innovation on Agroecology) project, led by the Confédération Paysanne du Faso (CPF). The project involves the Union Nationale des Producteurs d'Oignons du Burkina Faso (UNAPOB), the Institut de l'Environnement et de Recherches Agricoles (INERA), the Institut de Recherche en Sciences Appliquées et Technologies (IRSAT), and Afdi. The analysis focuses on agroecological innovations developed within the onion value chain in Bassitenga, Sandbontenga, and Yatenga. The main finding is that community participation appears stronger during implementation than during the initial design and diagnostic phase. The diagnostic process enabled the collection of local knowledge and the identification of producers' concerns. However, community involvement became more concrete during innovation experimentation, input management, community meetings, and collective activities. This finding is based on field data, including 100 questionnaires administered to rural actors and 20 interviews with resource persons, complemented by observations of project activities.

The FO-RI Project and the Valorization of Endogenous Knowledge

The FO-RI project adopts a research-action approach that seeks to connect producers' knowledge with scientific knowledge. This approach recognizes rural producers as actors who can contribute to the identification, experimentation, and adaptation of agricultural innovations. Within the onion value chain, producers mobilize knowledge and practices related to soil fertility, phytosanitary management, and post-harvest conservation.

These practices include the combined use of organic manure and mineral fertilizers, neem-based preparations, and improvements in onion storage practices. The initial diagnostic is an important stage in this process. It enables project actors to document producers' experiences, identify constraints, and consider local practices when defining project orientations.

However, recognition of local knowledge during the diagnostic phase does not necessarily mean that communities have the same level of involvement throughout the project.

Differentiated Participation Between Design and Implementation

The analysis distinguishes between two complementary dimensions of participation : design and implementation. The design and diagnostic phase involves identifying needs, analysing existing practices, and defining research and experimentation priorities. INERA and IRSAT provide technical expertise, while the CPF and its partners coordinate and support the process. At this stage, producers contribute primarily by sharing their experiences, constraints, and practices. The implementation phase, in contrast, involves testing and applying innovations under actual production conditions. The involvement of farmer organizations and producers becomes more visible at this stage. UNAPOB contributes to organizing activities within the onion value chain, while producers participate in experimentation, meetings, input management, and collective activities. The field data indicate a difference between these phases. During the diagnostic stage, participation takes the form primarily of consultation and information sharing.

During implementation, it is expressed more through practical activities and direct involvement in project actions. This does not mean that communities are absent from the design phase or that implementation is entirely community-led. Rather, it highlights a progressive change in the intensity and forms of participation

throughout the project cycle.

Several mechanisms support this involvement. Community meetings provide spaces for dialogue and consultation. Farmer organizations offer frameworks for coordination and collective management. Local leaders facilitate communication between communities and project actors. Participation becomes particularly visible through activities such as experimental plots, farmer experimentation groups, collective input-related activities, and storage management. These spaces allow producers to experiment with innovations, discuss results, and, where possible, contribute to their adaptation.

This evolution suggests that participation should not be assessed solely on the basis of initial consultation. Different stages of a project provide distinct opportunities for involvement and should therefore be analysed separately.

Implications for Development Communication and Human Rights

The FO-RI case highlights an important relationship between local participation and socio-economic dimensions of rural development. It suggests that participation becomes more concrete when communities are able to contribute to experimentation, implementation, and collective resource management.

This observation is particularly relevant to development communication. Communication is not limited to transmitting information from institutions to populations.

It also involves creating spaces for dialogue in which local knowledge can be expressed, discussed, and incorporated into collective action.

For actors working in food security, climate adaptation, and rural development, the FO-RI case highlights the importance of assessing participation at different stages of the project cycle. An evaluation limited to the initial diagnostic or consultation phase may fail to capture changes in community involvement during implementation.

The experience also highlights the importance of farmer organizations as spaces for coordination and collective action. However, membership in an organization alone is not a sufficient indicator of participation in governance. The effective involvement of women, young people, and other relevant groups should be assessed through their access to spaces for discussion, decision-making, and management.

Recommendations

Three orientations can be drawn from the FO-RI experience.

First, development partners should support mechanisms enabling farmer organizations to identify, experiment with, and document innovations derived from local knowledge. Linking such knowledge with scientific research can contribute to solutions adapted to local realities.

Second, evaluation frameworks should distinguish between the different forms and stages of participation. Indicators should assess not only consultation, but also involvement in experimentation, implementation, collective management, and decision-making.

Third, international partners could strengthen their support for local governance mechanisms while ensuring that participation remains inclusive. Attention should focus not only on the number of participants but also on their effective capacity to contribute to decisions and activity management.

Conclusion

The analysis of the FO-RI project highlights a difference between participation during project design and participation during implementation. The field data suggest that producer involvement becomes more concrete when activities move from diagnosis and consultation towards experimentation, collective action, and resource management. The initial diagnostic nevertheless remains essential. It makes it possible to identify constraints, document local knowledge, and better orient interventions. Participation should therefore be understood as an evolving process whose forms and intensity may vary according to the different stages of a project.

The FO-RI experience suggests that agricultural development projects should consider participation as a continuous process, extending from the collection of local knowledge to its mobilization in action. Supporting farmer organizations, recognizing endogenous knowledge,and creating spaces for collective decision-making can contribute to rural development approaches grounded in local realities.

DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION, BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS

HUMAN RIGHTS BY DESIGN: AI-ENABLED PUBLIC SERVICES, DIGITAL INCLUSION AND RIGHTS-BASED GOVERNANCE IN THE MENA REGION

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Artificial intelligence is moving from experimental technology into the everyday machinery of government. Across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), public authorities are expanding digital platforms, data systems and AI-enabled tools to make services faster, more responsive and more efficient. The opportunity is real: digital public services can reduce administrative burdens, reach people far from government offices and help institutions use information more effectively. But when access to a benefit, permit, health service or administrative decision depends on a digital system, design choices can affect equality, privacy, accessibility and access to remedy. At that point, digital transformation is no longer only a technology project. It becomes a human rights issue. Unlike many commercial interactions, people may have no meaningful alternative to the state, so errors or opaque procedures can directly affect livelihoods, mobility and legal status.

Fast transformation, uneven access

The region is advancing quickly, but not evenly. As one indicator of this unevenness, across the Arab States, internet use stands at about 70 per cent while mobile broadband coverage reaches roughly 95 per cent, leaving a significant usage gap linked to affordability and digital skills (UNDP, 2026). At the same time, national ambitions are accelerating. The UAE's AI strategy is tied directly to improving government performance; Saudi Arabia's National Strategy for Data and AI identifies a smarter and more effective public sector as a priority; and Morocco's Digital Morocco 2030 strategy presents digital transformation as a driver of social and economic development (UAE Government, 2017; SDAIA, 2020; Ministry of Digital Transition and Administration Reform, Morocco, 2024). These strategies show the scale of the opportunity. They also make rights-based safeguards more urgent. The policy challenge is therefore two-sided: governments need to avoid freezing useful innovation through abstract caution, while also avoiding a model in which efficiency is measured without asking who is excluded.

When digital access becomes a rights issue

A service may be online and still be inaccessible in practice. People can be excluded by unreliable connectivity, unaffordable devices, low digital literacy, inaccessible interfaces, language barriers or complex identity and authentication requirements. Older persons, persons with disabilities, low-income households, migrants and residents of remote areas may encounter different obstacles. OHCHR has stressed that even people without internet access can be affected by digitised decision-making and effectively left out of essential parts of economic and social life (OHCHR, 2023). A rights-based approach therefore asks a different question: not simply how many services have been digitised, but who can use them successfully and who bears the risk when systems fail.

Four safeguards for rights-based digital government

The first safeguard is *inclusive access*. Essential public services should not become "digital only" before accessible alternatives and assisted channels are in place. Governments should test services with the people most likely to face barriers, including disability organisations, rural communities and frontline public servants. This can reveal problems that technical teams may miss, from inaccessible interfaces and language choices to identity requirements that exclude people without standard documentation.

The second safeguard is *transparency*. When an automated or AI-assisted process influences a consequential decision, people should be told that technology is being used and receive an understandable explanation of the factors that shaped the outcome. UNESCO's Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence places transparency, explainability, fairness, privacy, accountability and human oversight at the centre of responsible AI (UNESCO, 2021). These principles are especially important in public administration because citizens cannot simply choose another provider when the state is the decision-maker.

The third safeguard is *meaningful human review and effective remedy*. Efficiency cannot replace due process. If an AI-supported system produces an inaccurate, discriminatory or harmful result, the affected person needs a clear route to

challenge it. Human oversight must be more than a formal signature: the reviewing official needs the authority, information and time to question an automated recommendation and change the outcome where necessary.

The fourth safeguard is *privacy and accountable procurement*. AI-enabled services can depend on large volumes of personal and administrative data, often processed through systems supplied by private technology companies. Public authorities do not outsource their human rights responsibilities when they outsource technology. Procurement rules should therefore require clear data-governance standards, audit access, security safeguards, incident reporting and sufficient transparency to investigate harmful outcomes. The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights provide a useful foundation: states have a duty to protect against business-related human rights harm, while companies have a responsibility to respect human rights and address adverse impacts (OHCHR, 2011).

A practical policy test

A rights-based approach does not require governments to slow digital transformation; it requires them to define success more broadly. Four policy tests can help.

First, preserve meaningful access to essential services through assisted or non-digital routes where exclusion remains likely.

Second, require human rights impact assessments before high-impact AI systems are deployed and repeat them when datasets, purposes or systems materially change.

Third, publish understandable information on where AI is used in public administration, what role it plays and how individuals can request human review or lodge a complaint.

Fourth, measure performance not only through speed, cost savings and service uptake, but also through accessibility, unequal outcomes, complaints, successful appeals and the experience of groups at risk of exclusion.

Why International Geneva matters

International Geneva can help move the debate from broad AI principles to practical implementation. Human rights mechanisms, international organisations and policy networks can encourage states to explain where automated systems affect access to public services, what safeguards are in place, how vulnerable groups are consulted and whether effective remedy exists.

Development partners can also support digital transformation in ways that treat inclusion, accessibility and accountability as measures of success rather than optional additions. For researchers and practitioners, the same shift is needed: the key question is not only what AI can do, but how its use redistributes access, power and administrative risk.

The next phase of digital government in the MENA region should be judged by more than technological sophistication. A genuinely smart public service is one that people can access, understand and challenge, and one for which public institutions remain accountable. Human rights should not be added after a system is built.

They should shape the data, design, procurement, oversight and remedy mechanisms from the beginning. That is what “human rights by design” should mean in an AI-enabled public sector.

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DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION, BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS

THE LANGUAGE OF OPPORTUNITY: AI, ARABIC, AND EGYPTIAN WOMEN'S ACCESS TO WORK

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A Paradox in the Numbers

Among Egyptian women aged 15 to 29, unemployment stood at 33.8 per cent in 2025, against 8.1 per cent for men in the same age group. Education does not ease the burden. Among women in that group holding intermediate, above intermediate or university qualifications, unemployment reached 38.3 per cent, against 10.1 per cent for men of the same age and qualification (CAPMAS, 2026).

Whatever stands between an educated Egyptian woman and paid work, it is not a shortage of qualification, and it is not a device or a connection. It is information, the skill to act on it, and whether she believes the opportunity is open to her at all.

Guidance as an Entitlement

Looking for work has always required a guide: someone to assess whether a qualification is relevant, to review a CV, to say whether applying is worthwhile. Such guidance has traditionally been offered through universities, so it reaches students more easily than graduates.

Article 6(2) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights commits states to technical and vocational guidance programmes, and Article 10(a) of CEDAW guarantees women the same conditions for career and vocational guidance. Both treat career guidance as part of the right to work and education, a commitment reflected in Egypt's own national strategies.

Generative artificial intelligence changed that arithmetic. A woman can now ask in her own words and, within minutes, have an unfamiliar advertisement broken into its essential requirements, a CV matched against a posting, a motivation letter drafted and an interview rehearsed. A service rationed by cost and connections became free.

Where Opportunities Circulate

Most women first meet an opportunity on social media pages, not official portals. There, opportunities circulate without being checked against their source: expired, non-existent, or paid programmes presented as scholarships. The problem is serious enough that the International Labour Organization publicly warns against fake vacancies that use its name to collect money and personal data (ILO, 2026).

Platforms reward speed and volume, not verification. The widest channels are the least verified, while official pages, which are accurate, rarely explain an opportunity in the language of an ordinary applicant.

The Arabic Gap

Arabic content teaching women to use these tools is scarce, often serves as a gateway to paid courses, and is addressed to a general, largely male audience. The tools themselves also perform less well in Arabic. A review of more than forty Arabic benchmarks points to scarce training data, complex morphology and wide dialectal variation (Alzubaidi et al., 2025). The first fine-grained evaluation of hallucination in Arabic found that all twelve models tested produced false statements of fact (Alansari and Luqman, 2025).

For a woman searching for work, this is concrete: a deadline that passed two years ago, an eligibility rule that was never written, a paid service presented as funded, all delivered fluently and without source or date. She writes in Egyptian colloquial Arabic and receives a weaker answer. A woman who reads English switches languages and receives a better one. A tool meant to close a gap widens it.

Permission, Trust and Exposure

Two further barriers appear repeatedly in my own practice, as informal observation rather than systematic data. Through the digital community I run, hundreds of women have written to ask, in effect, whether they are allowed to apply, even when they meet the requirements. One explanation is that women tend to read listed requirements as strict conditions rather than flexible guidance (Mohr, 2014). At least fifty have told me they stopped trusting AI tools after acting on information that turned out to be wrong. One bad answer did not cost them a single opportunity; it cost them the tool.

Then there is exposure. A Plan International survey of more than

14,000 girls and young women in 31 countries found that 58 per cent had been harassed online. Among those harassed frequently, 19 per cent reduced their use of the platform and 12 per cent stopped altogether. Facebook was where harassment was most common, and it is the same platform where much educational content for Egyptian women is published (Plan International, 2020). When women withdraw, they lose access to information and opportunity, not only safety, which links this issue to global work on technology-facilitated violence against women.

Who Is Absent When Systems Are Built

Women wrote between 5 and 10 percent of Egypt's artificial intelligence publications between 2010 and 2022 (OECD, 2024). As Women in AI Egypt puts it, if women are not present, the systems are built without them (Women in AI Egypt, 2026). Failures that fall mainly on Arabic-speaking women seeking work are the ones least likely to be measured.

Recommendations

Governments. Egypt has laid strong foundations. Its National Artificial Intelligence Strategy (2025-2030) commits to an Arabic foundation model and high-quality Arabic datasets, free national platforms such as Maharatech exist, and ministry initiatives have trained more than 43,000 women in digital skills (State Information Service, 2026). Building on this, career guidance tools could draw on verified national listings rather than the open web. Existing free platforms could be promoted through the channels women use most, and entry conditions could be widened so that training reaches women at the very start of their digital journey.

Media institutions. Move from event coverage of women's empowerment to regular, practical career guidance, featuring role models from public universities whose circumstances resemble those of the audience.

Platforms and AI developers. Under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, companies must respect rights whatever domestic law requires. AI systems should be evaluated in Arabic, including dialects, to the standard applied in English before release, and should display the original announcement and its date whenever they report an opportunity. Social platforms should let creators block all comments from an abusive user at once. Public institutions procuring AI career tools can require evidence of Arabic performance.

Content creators. Verify three things before publishing: the official source, an open deadline, and whether the opportunity is funded or requires payment. A partnership in which official bodies supply verified listings to high-reach creators, who in turn adopt shared publishing standards, would give the widest channels accuracy and the most accurate sources reach. Creators should teach women to search and verify for themselves, and offer closed spaces where questions carry no public cost.

International partners. OHCHR's B-Tech Project and international work on the gender digital divide offer a natural space to ensure AI-delivered career guidance serves women in Arabic-speaking countries.

Conclusion

Artificial intelligence has made career guidance free, but not yet reliable, safe or trusted for the women who need it most. Egypt has already recognized the importance of Arabic language tools in its national strategy. Building on that effort, the next step is ensuring women benefit fully from it, holding those who publish opportunities to verification standards, and keeping digital spaces safe enough for women to stay.

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EVENT & NEWS

Meet FINDINGS: Our New Human Rights Research Podcast

We are pleased to announce the launch of **FINDINGS: the Human Rights Podcast**, a human rights research-focused podcast featuring innovative thinkers and practitioners from diverse contexts in conversation with the Geneva Centre team. Each season will bring together contributions from around the world, with a particular focus on research relevant to advancing human rights in the Middle East and North Africa.

A New Space for Diplomatic Dialogue

In September, we held our first **Diplomatic Breakfast**, *Growing Up Online: Protecting Children's Rights in the Digital Age*, bringing together diplomatic representatives, UN experts and practitioners to discuss AI, digital technologies and children's rights. The exchange highlighted the importance of effective implementation and rights-based safeguards in the digital environment.

Bringing Young Voices Into Human Rights Dialogue

We also launched our first **Youth Policy Lab**, on *International Justice and Conflict Prevention: The Tortoise and the Hare*, bringing students together with academics and a diplomatic practitioner to explore international justice and conflict prevention. The participatory format gave young participants space to engage directly with experts, exchange perspectives and develop their own recommendations.

To stay informed about our latest initiatives, visit our website at **www.gchragd.org**, follow us on **LinkedIn** and **X**, or contact us at **info@gchragd.org**.

Editorial Credits
This edition of the *Human Rights Chronicle* was prepared by *Martina Paoletti*, with the support of *Fabrice Crégut*. Graphic design support was provided by *Chaï Chaï*.

IMPORTANT EVENTS

Geneva Peace Forum 2026
12-15 October | *Palais des Nations, Geneva*

The Geneva Peace Forum brings together organizations based in Geneva and international partners to exchange knowledge and practices on peacebuilding across different contexts and disciplines, fostering dialogue and collaboration on contemporary peace and conflict-related challenges.

War in the Middle East: What Future for the Global Order?
14 October, 12:00-14:00 | *CICG, Geneva*

Organized by the Geneva Graduate Institute in collaboration with the CCIG, this discussion will explore how developments in the Middle East are reshaping global power dynamics, international law, multilateral cooperation, and the international order.

2026 Social Forum
29-30 October | *Palais des Nations, Geneva*

Organized by the Human Rights Council, the 2026 Social Forum will explore how international cooperation and solidarity, including South-South cooperation, can contribute to realizing the right to health and advancing the right to development.

AHRI Conference 2026
4-6 November | *Geneva*

The 2026 Annual Conference of the Association of Human Rights Institutes will mark the 60th anniversaries of the ICCPR and ICESCR and the 20th anniversary of the Human Rights Council, reflecting on their contributions and continuing challenges.

IPU Global Parliamentary Conference on Human Rights
12-13 November | *Geneva*

The conference will bring together parliamentarians, UN representatives, national human rights institutions, and civil society to discuss how parliaments can translate human rights commitments into national action and address challenges to fundamental freedoms and inclusion.

GENEVA CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ADVANCEMENT AND GLOBAL DIALOGUE

The Geneva Centre for Human Rights Advancement and Global Dialogue (GCHRAGD) is an independent, non-governmental organization with consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). The Centre advances human rights through research, international advocacy, and the promotion of intercultural dialogue, with a particular focus on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The Human Rights Chronicle is a periodic publication of the Geneva Centre that curates academic research and perspectives on contemporary human rights issues. The views expressed in this publication are those of the respective authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Centre.